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Violence, Selection and Infant Mortality in Congo∗
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Abstract
This paper documents the effects of the recent civil war in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo on mortality both in utero and during the first
year of life. It instruments for conflict intensity using a mineral price
index, which exploits the exogenous variation in the potential value of
mineral resources generated by changes in world mineral prices to predict
the geographic distribution of the conflict. Using estimates of civil war
exposure on mortality across male and female newborn to assess their rel-
ative health, it provides evidence of culling effect (in utero selection) as a
consequence of in utero shocks.
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1 Introduction
The foetal origins hypothesis associated with David J. Barker (1992) postulates
that chronic, degenerative conditions of adult health, including heart disease and
type 2 diabetes, may be triggered by adverse circumstance experienced in utero.
Two broad sets of empirical literature developed around this fundamental intu-
ition.1 The first one, spanning across medicine, epidemiology and economics, in-
vestigates the long term health consequences of in utero shocks. There is a large
consensus that shocks negatively affect children anthropometric measures and
adults’ self-reported health status, mental health, height, schizophrenia, and life
expectancy.2 The second strain of literature, developed mainly by economists,
focuses instead on the long term socio-economic outcomes of early-life shocks.
Most studies show evidence on how early shocks may result in poorer outcomes
both in education and labor markets (e.g., Aguero and Deolalikar 2012; Case et
al. 2002; 2005; Case and Paxson 2008; Lavy et al. 2016; Lee 2014; Leon 2012;
Miller and Urdinola 2010; Sanders 2012; Shah and Steinberg 2017; von Hinke
et al. 2014).3
A common feature of many of these studies is the heterogeneity of their
results across gender. Focusing on very recent studies, Akbulut (2017) studying
the effect of WWII in utero exposure on recent health measures finds larger
effects in the female sample. Similarly, Lavy et al. (2016) investigating the
1On the theory side, Heckman (2007) amended the standard Grossman
(1972) model of the development of health capital to consider foetal origins,
in which the production of health depends on health investments at different
developmental stages of childhood. One implication of this model is that the
effects of prenatal investment shocks may be non-monotonic in age and allow
long term returns of early investments.
2See e.g., Akbulut (2017); Akresh et al. (2012a); Akresh et al. (2012b);
Bobonis et al. (2016); Bozzoli and Quintana-Domeque (2014); Camacho (2008);
Carlson (2015); Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013); Dominguez and Barre (2013);
Kesternich et al. (2014); Koppensteiner and Manacorda (2016); Lin and Liu
(2014); Mansoor and Rees (2012); Minoiu and Shemyakina (2012); Torche
(2011); van den Berg et al. (2016). Almond and Currie 2011 provide an excellent
review of this literature.
3Currie and Vogl (2013), reviewing this literature, also considers the effects
of early shocks for live children on later outcomes, whereas Currie et al. (2014)
reviews the literature focusing on the consequences of early exposure to pollution.
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impact of a sudden migration of a large portion of the Ethiopian Jews to Israel
(Operation Solomon) on the education of children in utero during the operation,
reports significant improvements in education only for girls. Van der Berg et al.
(2016) instead finds no effects of famine on the height of girls.
The accuracy of the estimates of the long term consequences of in utero
shocks, and of their gender specific findings, hinges on the assumption that
the composition of the population affected by the shock does not change as a
result of the shock itself, i.e. that no selection occurs in utero because of the
shock. Absent any shock during pregnancy, a share of foetuses at the bottom
of the foetal health distribution are lost because their health endowment does
not exceed the survival threshold, i.e. the level of health needed to reach birth.
The resulting live births would generate the natural (secondary) sex ratio, i.e.,
the odds of a newborn’s being male. Following the work of Trivers and Willard
(1973), however, a number of studies suggest that in utero shocks (of different
nature, including terrorism, pollution, maternal fasting, earthquake, cold waves)
may increase foetal loss, and more specifically may reduce the number of boys
relative to girls at birth, underlying the need to better grasp the mechanisms
at play during pregnancy to correctly interpret outcomes emerging later in life
(Shettles 1961; Mizuno 2000; Kraemer 2000; Catalano et al. 2006; Roseboom
et al. 2001; Almond et al. 2008; Herna´ndez-Julia´n et al. 2014; Eriksson et
al. 2010; Black et al. 2016; Fukuda et al. 1998; Torche and Kleinhaus 2012;
Catalano et al. 2006; Catalano et al. 2008; Sanders and Stoecker 2011; Almond
and Mazumder 2011).
Two separate mechanisms intertwine as a result of in utero shocks, both
resulting in a reduction of the (secondary) sex ratio: the culling (or selection)
and the scarring effects (Valente 2015, Catalano and Bruckner 2006).4
The culling effect directly links to the Trivers andWillard hypothesis. Trivers
and Willard (1973) postulate that through the evolutionary process women de-
4Notice that selection can occur also after birth, in the form of infant mor-
tality affecting the weaker section of the cohort. This has been recently studied
by Almond (2006) exploring the long term consequences of the 1918 Influenza
pandemic in the US, and Bozzoli, Deaton, and Quintana-Domeque (2009) re-
porting that the culling effect dominating in developing countries, resulting in
even taller adults in response to early life shocks.
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veloped the ability to (unconsciously) adjust their offspring’s sex-ratio, favoring
daughters when experiencing poor conditions, in order to maximise the number
of surviving grandchildren. The logic behind the mechanism follows from the
different reproduction probability for male and female individuals at times of
hardship. In polygynous societies, having a daughter would maximise the re-
production chances of families not belonging to the elite. More formally, this
implies that the additional losses of male foetuses in response to in utero nega-
tive shocks result from a “reduced maternal tolerance of males at the low end
of a relatively constant distribution of survivability” (Catalano and Bruckner
2006). In other words, the pre-shock distribution of foetal health would remain
relatively unaffected, but the health survival threshold would move upwards
and the sex ratio would change because the low end of the health distribution
is disproportionally populated by male foetuses.
The scarring effect, instead, results from a downwards shift of the entire
foetal health distribution as a consequence of the negative shock, reducing the
health endowment of each foetus in the population at the time of the shock.
Naturally, part of the distribution, which was marginally above the survival
threshold before the shock, falls below the threshold and is lost in utero. As for
the culling effect, since the low end of the health distribution is disproportionally
populated by male foetuses, a reduction of the sex ratio follows. Even though
both mechanisms result in a sex ratio reduction, they have different predictions
on the health endowment of the surviving population: while the culling effect
would generate a population of relatively more healthy individuals (notably
among boys), the scarring effect would imply the opposite.
Based on these predictions a relatively narrow literature emerged recently
to assess the degree of selection in utero and find evidence of culling vs. scar-
ring effects. Catalano and Bruckner (2006) provide evidence of culling effect
by showing that the sex ratio among Swedish cohorts born in the years 1751
through 1912 predicts male cohort life expectancy at birth. Similarly, Catalano
et al. (2008) find that cold ambient temperatures during gestation predict lower
secondary sex ratios and longer life span of males in annual birth cohorts com-
posed of Danes, Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes born in the period 1878-1914,
again suggestive of the culling effect operating.
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Using sex differences in pollution-driven neonatal and infant mortality rates
as an estimate of relative sex sensitivity, Sanders and Stoeker (2015) show that
the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, by substantially improving air quality,
caused a 0.47 percentage point increase in the probability of a live birth being
male. Consistent with the culling effect, males display a greater post-natal
mortality reductions than females.
Finally, Valente (2015) uses in utero exposure to the 1996-2006 Maoist in-
surgency in Nepal to assess culling and scarring effects. Her results show that
exposed pregnancies are more likely to result in a miscarriage and in a female
birth. Since exposed newborns do not seem to suffer of a poorer health (mea-
sured by a dummy for small babies and infant mortality), the author interprets
her results as evidence of both scarring and culling effects operating.
Our study contributes to this recent literature by studying the effects of the
recent civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on mortality both
in utero and during the first year of life. The contribution of this study to this
literature is twofold. First, it addresses the potential endogeneity of conflict.
Conflict is typically not randomly located and failing to properly account for
this may lead to a bias in the estimated results. The fact that violence has been
reported to target wealthier households in neighboring countries like Burundi
(Bundervoet 2010), Rwanda (Verpoorten 2009), and Uganda (Blattman and
Annan 2010) suggests a bias that may push the estimated response of socioe-
conomic outcomes to conflict toward zero. Besides the likely nonrandomness of
conflict, microlevel data on conflict events (based on news reports) may suffer
from measurement errors. Conflict events in more remote and less connected
locations will typically be underreported in the news and consequently in the
data (Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2006; Verpoorten 2012). Controlling for
the endogeneity solves these two issues at least partially. We instrument for
conflict intensity using a mineral price index, which exploits the exogenous vari-
ation in the potential value of mineral resources generated by changes in world
mineral prices to predict the geographic distribution of the conflict. Second,
using estimates of civil war exposure on mortality across male and female new-
borns to assess their relative health, this study provides an additional test on
the presence of culling and scarring effect as a consequence of in utero shocks.
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In line with the above literature, our analysis confirms that in utero expo-
sure (particularly during the first two trimesters of the pregnancy) increases
foetal losses. More specifically, we find that conflict reduces the number of male
live births, compatible with both scarring and culling effects. Zooming on the
effects of conflict exposure on infant (0-12 months) mortality, however, reveals a
gender imbalance in the impact. Strong and robust evidence, including mother
fixed effects regressions, shows that conflict significantly increases infant mor-
tality only among girls. Since newborn boys and girls are likely to undergo the
same conflict exposure, we interpret our results as evidence of culling effect:
maternal exposure to conflict during pregnancy determined an increase of the
health survival threshold, with the consequence of increasing the average health
endowment of the newborns, particularly among boys, disproportionally pop-
ulating the low end of the health distribution.5 In other words, even though
both boys and girls are exposed to conflict, only among (relatively weak) girls
this increases mortality. As in Valente (2015) we cannot entirely exclude the
presence of scarring effect.6 However, if scarring did occur, its effects on the av-
erage health of the cohort exposed in utero was more than offset by the positive
selection due to the culling effect.
Besides the literature discussed above, this study also contributes to the
literature exploring the consequences of civil wars on children health. A large
literature assesses the costs of civil wars for the affected societies, and argues
that the impact of violence on the demography of a society can substantially
increase the overall costs of a conflict, falling mainly on women and children
(Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 2008).
The literature identifies a variety of factors which may negatively affect infants’
health during a civil war. Malnutrition, resulting from the contraction of the
internal supply of food and a partial collapse of trade in the regions in which
violence unravels, for instance, worsens the general health status of the affected
population (Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006; Jenkins, Scanlan, and Pe-
5In the appendix, we test for gender discrimination behavior which may
explain the gender unbalance in infant mortality, finding no support for it.
6The small and selected sample of children featuring anthropometric mea-
sures in the DHS 2007 covering the conflict period does not allow us to further
dig into this issue.
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terson 2007; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh 2009; Akresh and Edmonds
2011). Areas affected by violence are also characterized by losses of or poor
access to health infrastructures, due to lack of equipment and human resources
and health programs (such as prevention through vaccination and health edu-
cation) are usually interrupted or implemented discontinuously, increasing the
spread of vector-borne diseases. Finally, when displacement of large shares of
a population occurs, lack of clean water and hygiene leads to a higher risk of
diarrhea, one of the major causes of child morbidity and mortality.
In line with these intuitive considerations, infant mortality rates are regularly
reported to increase in areas affected by civil war. The detrimental effect is
consistent across humanitarian organization reports, medicine and economics
literature (Toole, Galson, and Brady 1993; Goma Epidemiology Group 1995;
Danish Epidemiology Science Centre 1999; Kiros and Hogan 2001; Me´decins
sans Frontie`res 2003; Coghlan et al. 2006; Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis 2004;
Guha-Sapir et al. 2005; Guha-Sapir and D’Aoust 2010; Davis and Kuritsky
2002; de Walque 2005; Singh et al. 2005; Verwimp and Van Bavel 2005). None
of these studies, however, explicitly controls for the potential endogeneity of
conflict location.
In the next section we provide the relevant background information on the
armed conflict in the DRC. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 lays out the
empirical strategy, and results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses
two potential threats to our identification strategy, namely endogenous fertility
decisions, and migration. The last section concludes.
2 Historical Background
The DRC has experienced two of the most violent wars in recent history. The
first Congolese war, which started at the end of 1996, is usually interpreted as
a fight by the coalition of the Congolese rebellion led by Laurent-Desire Kabila
with the foreign governments of Rwanda and Uganda not only to overthrow
Mobutu but also to eradicate the presence of Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern
DRC, where they had escaped in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide (Vlassen-
root and Raeymaekers 2004; Prunier 2009).
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The second Congolese war unfolded between 1998 and 2004, with an aston-
ishing estimated death toll of more than 3.8 million people (International Rescue
Committee 2011) and an estimated 1.7 million internally displaced people (In-
ternal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011). This magnitude of death and
displacement is likely to have affected the health of infants. Interestingly, there
is extensive anecdotal evidence of the role of minerals in shaping the dynamics
of the conflicts, particularly during the second war (Congdon Fors and Olsson
2004; Turner 2007; Gambino 2011; Stearns 2011; Sanchez de la Sierra 2013).
This link will constitute the rationale of our instrumental variable strategy.
Figure 1 reports the total number of conflict events recorded by ACLED
in the period 1997-2004, aggregated at the district level. The provinces most
heavily affected by the violence were Orientale and North and South Kivu (in
the eastern part of the country), the areas in which the concentration of local
and foreign armed groups was highest. Conflict was also concentrated in the
territory of Pweto (Haut-Katanga, the southernmost district) in the Katanga
province as well as in Kinshasa (the only dark region in the western part of the
country in Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3 Data Sources and Sample Construction
To assess the impact of in utero exposure to conflict we make use of the De-
mographic and Health Survey (DHS) on DRC carried out in 2007. Since we
take advantage of the timing and location variations of conflict events, our main
sample excludes children for whom we do not know exactly where their house-
hold was living at the time of their birth. This 2007 DHS dataset provides
the number of years a household has been living in the village where the inter-
view took place. Information about previous location is, however, not available,
which means that we do not know whether households who migrated remained
in the same district. In the appendix (Table A3, A5, A7, and A9) we show our
main results when including children belonging to nonresident households and
children from an additional DHS wave released in 2014, whose main but critical
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weakness is to not distinguish between migrant and resident households.7 We
select those children in utero and born between 1997 and 2004, encompassing
the two Congolese wars. DHS surveys are meant to be nationally representative
and collect individual information on women aged 15 to 49 on education, de-
mographic, and health issues as well as some information on the location of the
interview, among which are GPS coordinates. Because only surviving women
are interviewed, we are likely to underestimate the impact of conflict on infant
health. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that this source of sample se-
lection will affect gender imbalances in child mortality. Thanks to the inclusion
of each woman’s maternal history in the dataset, we have recovered detailed
information such as when her children were born; whether they are still alive
and if not, when they died; and whether they were part of a multiple birth.
This enables us to create variables counting the number of brothers and sisters
alive (of various age brackets) at the time of a child’s birth.
For our panel regressions, we aggregate the above information to obtain a
measure of the total number of births, the number of male and female births,
the survival rates across boys and girls in the first year of life (defined as male
or female (births-deaths)/births) for each month in each district.
We also take advantage of the geographical information linked to each DHS
cluster to create three climatic variables. Given the emerging evidence on the
links between weather shocks and violence (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013),
introducing these variables could potentially reduce the risk of confounding
factors.
We include cumulative rainfall and average temperature based on monthly
observations aggregated during the first 12 months of life of each child. In line
with the use of weather data in economics, weather variables are expressed in
7Including migrants, as commonly stressed in the literature, is likely to create
noise, as some migrants surveyed in the conflict affected region may not have
experienced conflict at all, whereas some migrants in the control regions may
have ended there escaping conflict after experiencing violence. In this respect,
a critical weakness of 2013 DHS is to not distinguish between migrant and
resident households. Moreover, recall data bias is much more likely to represent
a problem in a survey collected 10 years after the end of the period studied. The
lower coefficients in the specifications including the 2013 DHS are consistent
with the attenuation bias expected, and substantiate our concerns.
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terms of anomalies, i.e. deviation to long-term mean (that is, of the previous 25
years), divided by the correspondent long-term standard deviation (Dell et al.
2014, Marchiori et al. 2012, Barrios et al. 2010). The data used to construct
the measure of precipitation and temperature come from Terrestrial Precipita-
tion: 1900–2008 Gridded Monthly Time Series, Version 2.01, interpolated and
documented by Matsuura and Willmott (2009). This dataset is a compilation
of updated sources and provides monthly precipitation (and mean temperature)
interpolated to a latitude/longitude grid of 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree.
We also create a third variable combining rainfall with daily temperature ob-
tained from the Prediction of Worldwide Energy Resource (POWER) database
of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): the number
of months of potential malaria exposure in the first 12 months of life. To build
such an index we apply the approach proposed by Kudamatsu , Persson, and
Stro¨mberg (2012). Four conditions have to be simultaneously satisfied for a
month to be considered as malaria prone: The malaria index Mdm for district
d and month m is set to 1 if and only if:
1. average monthly rainfall during the past 3 months is at least 60 mm,
2. rainfall in at least 1 of the past 3 months is at least 80 mm,
3. no day in the past 12 months has an average temperature below 5◦C, and
4. the average temperature in the past 3 months exceeds 19.5◦C plus the
standard deviation of the monthly temperature in the past 12 months.
For the first stage of our instrumental variables estimates, we investigate
the relationship between conflict events and mineral prices. To this end, we
construct a panel dataset of conflict events and a price index. We filter the data
from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset on
the DRC and keep events from January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2004 (Raleigh
et al. 2010).8 A conflict event is defined as a single altercation wherein force is
used by one or more groups for a political end (Raleigh et al. 2010). Thanks
to the availability in the dataset of GPS coordinates for each conflict event, we
8We exclude riots, defined in ACLED as violent, spontaneous grouping of
unarmed groups, as they are not proper conflict events.
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assign each conflict to its respective district and time period, using the shapefiles
on DRC from the Global Administrative Areas Database. For each month in
the period considered, we create a district-level measure of conflict by summing
all events taking place in a given district (ConflictEvent).9
The data on mineral location is obtained from the mineral occurrences map
of DRC, a comprehensive database on the mineral sector of the country provided
by the geological service of the Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA) of
Tervuren, Belgium. The database is the result of a recent effort to update and
digitize the “Carte des gˆıtes mine´raux du Za¨ıre”, released in 1974 by the geolog-
ical service of the country to allow for a general overview of mineral occurrences
and potential (Lepersonne 1974).10 The intensive past exploration resulted in
a vast amount of detailed reports and maps, most of which are held at the
Royal Museum for Central Africa. Its archives contain most of the records of
the former Geological Survey of Congo, the exploration and production records
of mining companies and information based on its own fieldwork on the coun-
try. A systematic classification and assessment of this vast collection enriched
substantially the map featuring 614 mineral deposits. The resulting database
contains a considerably more detailed information on the mineral deposits in
DRC as compared to any other existing source (e.g. the Metallogenic Map of
Africa (2002), or the SNL dataset). Furthermore, by the very nature of the data
collection, entries in the mineral occurrence map are less likely to be influenced
by political processes and ongoing violence, as compared to data on contempo-
raneous mineral exploitations or mining concessions used in the recent literature
(e.g. Maystadt et al. 2014).
We validate our first stage results using two alternative datasets on mineral
locations, the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the SNL datasets, both used
9ACLED reports the number of casualties only for a reduced
subset of the events. An alternative source of conflict data
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP—available at
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/), which reports casualties,
is put to use to offer robustness checks.
10The exploration surveys and mapping were conducted with the assistance
of the UNDP, Belgium (mainly through the geological department of the Royal
Museum for Central Africa of Tervuren) and France (through the Bureau de
Recherches Ge´ologiques et Minie`res).
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in the recent literature investigating the impact of minerals on civil war, but
providing a much more restricted set of mineral deposits for DRC: 134 and 44,
respectively.11
The location of ore deposits for various minerals is assigned to one of the
38 districts. We therefore know the mineral potential of each district of DRC,
which we use to compute a price index.
Figures 2 reports the geographical distribution by district of mineral location
in DRC. Darker shaded districts feature more mineral deposits. Comparing it
with Figure 1, it is rather striking that the eastern part of the country, richer
in minerals, experienced more conflict events. This correlation, however, does
not account for time variations, which we intend to exploit by interacting the
mineral potential of each district with the monthly price of the corresponding
resource.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
We turn to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) dataset to get the monthly price series of 12 minerals (aluminum, copper,
gold, iron, lead, manganese, nickel, oil, phosphate, tin, wolframite, and zinc)
and compile information from The Economics of Tantalum (Roskill Informa-
tion Services 2009), Metal Pages, and the US Geological Survey to build our
price series for tantalum. The number of potential extraction sites is interacted
with the monthly mineral prices to obtain a time-varying measure of relative
mineral value by district (Price Index). For each time period and district, we
compute a price index taking account of the number of mineral deposits and
the price for the set of 13 minerals, as follows:
Price Indexit =
∑
r
ωriprt, (1)
where ωri = mineralsri/
∑
j mineralsrj is a weight measuring the relative im-
portance of mineral r in district i with respect to all districts (j) and prt is the
11The USGS dataset is publicly available at: mrdata.usgs.gov/mineral-
resources/mrds-global.html. The SNL dataset is available for sale at:
snl.com/Sectors/MetalsMining.
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price of mineral r at period t with a price normalized to 100 for the first period
(January 1997).12
Ideally, one would account for the size of the different deposits, which is
likely to shape the response of conflict to price increase. For instance, lots of
small mining sites in a district may be more easily contested by armed groups.
Or alternatively, one large mining site may guarantee a much larger wealth
in response to a price increase, but may also prove more difficult to conquer.
However, despite the high quality of the mineral location dataset, the size of
deposit is provided only for a small subset of the mining location. Since we
have no information as to the realized or potential extraction of ores of each
mineral location, we decided to weigh each monthly ore price by a ratio of the
number of mineral deposits in the district over the total number of deposits
of this particular mineral in the country. This way, we intend to proxy the
extraction potential by ore of each district. We sum this potential over all
minerals in a price index in order to reflect the district resource endowment
value at each point in time. In other words, we capture how the monthly change
in mineral prices alters the relative potential value of the mining sector across
districts. The idea of using international commodity prices to predict local
conflict is well established in the literature (Dube and Varges 2013; Berman
et al. 2015; Maystadt et al. 2014). The strategy adopted here is similar to
the one adopted by Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) in their study on conflict in
sub-Saharan Africa.13
The main variables used in our analysis are described in Table 1. In order
to obtain a nationally representative dataset, we resort to sampling weights
provided in the DHS. These are needed to render the estimates independent
from the sampling design.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
12An alternative weighting matrix, ωri = mineralsri/
∑
M mineralsMi, fo-
cussing on the district relative dependence from specific minerals (r) with re-
spect to all minerals (M) in the district rather than the aggregate relative value
across districts (and over time), also generates a significant (but substantially
weaker) first stage.
13A logarithmic version of our price index produces similar results.
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4 Empirical Strategy
The ultimate goal is to assess the presence of culling vs. scarring effects resulting
from in utero exposure to conflict. Since the timing and location of conflict
events is likely to be nonrandom and correlated to our dependent variable, we
turn to an instrumental variable analysis. We first discuss in detail the first-
stage relationship, wherein we predict conflict distribution based on the change
in mineral prices. We then use this instrument to assess the impact of conflict
on in utero and infant mortality.
Conflict
In the context of conflict in the DRC, we expect resources to shape the dis-
tribution of violence. We therefore use the previously described price index to
predict the intensity of conflict by district and over time. Formally, the first-
stage specification is as follows:
ConflictEventsdm = αd + βm (+δdm) + γPrice Indexdm + εdm, (2)
where ConflictEventsdm =
∑11
j=0 ConflictEventsdm+j is our preferred mea-
sures of conflict, and Price Indexdm =
∑11
j=0 Price Indexdm+j . Indeed, given
the interest of this study, we run the first stage to predict, for each district
d and month m in the sample, the conflict distribution over the following 12
months.14 We control for district fixed effects, αd, time fixed effects, βm (a set
of 96 dummies, one for each year-month in our sample), and, in some specifica-
tions, district-specific linear time trends, δdm.
15
The conflict literature identifies several channels through which the change
in mineral prices can affect the intensity of violence. Intuitively, a price increase
of a specific mineral raises its relative value, thereby increasing the incentives
14In Figure A1 in the appendix, we report the average price index, the average
price index computed on the 3TG minerals only, and the average level of Conflict
Events over the period considered. We also report the average price index and
Conflict Events for four of the most troubled districts in DRC in Figure A2.
15In the appendix we also adopt an alternative measure of conflict, which
records for each month the number of months featuring violence in the districts
over the following 12 months.
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for armed groups to re-allocate their fighting effort towards controlling mining
sites in which that mineral is extracted. This first channel, named by Dube and
Vargas (2013) the rapacity effect, would then predict a positive relationship
between mineral prices changes and conflict intensity (Berman et al. 2015,
Maystadt et al. 2014).
The second channel, centered around the concept of state capacity, focuses
on the incentives of armed groups controlling mining sites for taxation, or more
generally rent-seeking behavior. According to this mechanism, armed groups
controlling mining sites would re-allocate part of their effort away from fight-
ing towards taxing the local mining activity, in response to a price increase of
minerals they control (Parker and Vadheim 2016, Sanchez de la Sierra 2013).16
The relationship between mineral prices changes and conflict intensity would in
this case be negative: armed groups reduce their violence to focus on taxing the
mineral whose relative value increased.
The third channel, referred to as the opportunity cost effect in the literature,
focuses on the supply side of the market for fighters (Dube and Vargas 2013). An
increase of mineral prices, by increasing the wage or creating more job opportu-
nities in the local mining sector, would reduce the pool of individuals willing to
join a rebel group and engage in violence. As for the previous mechanism, the
relationship between mineral prices changes and conflict intensity would in this
case be negative: higher mineral prices reduce the size of armed groups which
map into an overall lower level of violence.
The estimate of γ in our first stage equation is likely to capture the joint
effect of these mechanisms, and the sign of the coefficient will ultimately help
us detecting the relative importance of the various effects.
16It is worth pointing out that the literature discussing the latter channel
relies exclusively on the Congo wars and empirical data from them to develop
their arguments. A similar trade-off between rent-seeking (or taxation) and
conflict is also described in the theoretical framework of De Luca et al. (2011)
and Maystadt et al. (2014).
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In utero mortality
The predicted conflict is first used to estimate the impact of in utero exposure
to conflict on in utero mortality. In particular, we estimate the effect of in
utero exposure to conflict on the number of male and female births, and the
probability for a newborn to be a boy, to test whether male and female foetuses
are differently affected.
We implement two sets of regressions. The first set uses a collapsed version
of the dataset at the month-district level to run panel level regressions (the
observation in this context is a district-month). The second set of tests fully
exploits the richness of the dataset to run cross-sectional regressions in which
the observation is a child.
We run the following fixed-effect panel regressions:
Vdm = αd + βm + γConflictdt + εdm. (3)
where m still denotes the month of birth, and t specifies the time bracket over
which the conflict events are aggregated. As explained, we correct for endogene-
ity with two-stage least squares, instrumenting conflict by mineral prices, and
estimate the following system of equations:
Vdm = αd + βm + γConflictdt + εdm
Conflictdt = δd + ρm + ηPrice Indexdt + ǫdm. (4)
where Vdm will be the number of (male/female) births in district d and month
m when checking for the impact in utero exposure.
The alternative cross-sectional approach estimates the following model, in
which the unit of observation is a child, i, born at month m, in district d.
Widm = αd + βm + δ
′
Xi + λ
′
X + γConflictEventsdm + εidm, (5)
where Xi is a vector of control variables including whether the child was part
of a multiple birth, whether she was the first child, her number of siblings alive
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by gender and age groups, a malaria index (summing the number of months
of exposure to malaria), and rainfall and temperature anomalies (with respect
to a long-term average of 25 years). A further set of variables, X, controls for
household characteristics including the education level of the mother, being a
female headed household, the size of the household and a measure of the wealth
of the household.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of conflict distribution, the conflict
intensity measure is instrumented by the mineral price index described above.
Formally, the following system of two equations is estimated by two-stage least
square:
Widm = αd + βm + δ
′
Xi + λ
′
X + γConflictEventsdm + εidm
ConflictEventsdm = δd + ρm + η
′
Xi + θ
′
X + νPrice Indexdm + υidm.
(6)
whereWidm will be the probability to be a boy/girl when checking for the impact
in utero exposure.
Infant mortality
We next study infant mortality rate during the first year of life to assess the
presence of scarring and culling effects. Formally we replicate the estimation of
models (4) and (6) where Vdm and Widm will be the first year (male/female)
survival rate in district d and month m, and (male/female) mortality, respec-
tively. The latter is defined as the mortality of children by 12 months of age:
we check 12 months after her birth whether she is still alive and assign value 1
to our binary variable Mortalityidm if child i died during the first 12 months of
her life.
The idea behind this empirical strategy is to exploit the timing and spatial
variations of conflict events and to compare children born in the same month in
districts affected differently by conflict. Standard errors are clustered at the dis-
trict level, and sampling weights are used to render the estimates independent of
the sampling design. Given the small number of clusters (n = 38) which might
produce underestimated intra-group correlation, we turn to 1000 replications
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of wild bootstrap (percentile-t method), known to resist to heteroskedasticity,
to compute confidence intervals (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2008). As men-
tioned before, the regressions are run on the sample of children known to have
been born in their mother’s interview district.
Beyond the power of the instruments, this empirical strategy is based on
a key identifying assumption. If mineral prices were to influence infant health
in utero and the post natal year through another channel than the occurrence
of violence, this would violate our exclusion restriction. While the relative
weight of the first two mechanisms (rapacity vs state capacity effects) does not
affect the overall validity of our IV strategy, the opportunity cost channel may
represent a serious threat to our empirical strategy. If an increase in mineral
prices reduced violence by creating higher income opportunities in mining for
locally sourced fighters, the potential income effects generated may directly
affect infant mortality, thereby violating our exclusion restriction. There is
a recent literature showing that starting mining activities in the context of
developing countries may have some beneficial effects on the welfare of the
population living nearby (Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016, Tolonen 2016). We
consider this threat very seriously. First, even though mining industries are
found to increase local welfare during peace, the local effects of a mineral price
increase are theoretically much more ambiguous in the lawless context of an
ongoing conflict, in which the vast majority of mining activities are directly
or indirectly controlled by armed groups. More specifically, it is unclear what
share of the surplus, generated by the price increase, would be captured by
the different agents involved in the business (e.g., miners, taxing armed group,
traders). The work by Parker and Vadheim (2016) and Sanchez de la Sierra
(2013), focusing both on DRC conflicts, suggest that armed groups may adjust
their taxing behavior fairly quickly in response to changes in the profitability of
mining.
Second, our second-stage point estimates are roughly unchanged when con-
trolling for household characteristics such as the education of the mother or
household wealth, variables usually capturing household income. Such a heuris-
tic approach to assess the risk of omitted variable is further supported by Oster
(2016) bounding validation check, documented in Section 5. Even though the
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wealth index may fail to entirely capture transitory income shocks linked to min-
eral prices, it is a further indication that there may be not much of an income
effect after all.
Third, assuming the potential income effect to be naturally concentrated
in the areas around the mines we directly assess its impact by replicating the
estimation of our empirical models in which the children living within 10, 20,
and 30 kilometers from the mineral deposits are removed from the sample. If
income effects are present, we should observe a dramatic change in our estimates
when removing the areas most concerned by the mining activities. The choice of
the relevant distance (up to 30 kilometers) is informed by the existing literature.
Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016), studying the welfare effect of mining, restrict the
analysis in the area within 20 kilometers from the mines, arguing that beyond
this distance they partially fail to capture the mine footprint. Furthermore, the
existing literature on commuting distances in urban and rural Africa shows that
areas of 5, 10 or 15 kilometers are likely integrated markets (see e.g., Amoh-
Gymiah and Aidoo 2013, Kung et al. 2014, and Shafer, 2000).
Fourth, even though our first stage relationship works well also if we predict
conflict with the lagged price index or the average price index computed over
the previous months, we chose to use the contemporaneous price index as a
deliberate strategy to reduce the likelihood of income effects, which arguably
would emerge with a lag.17
Finally, to further reinforce the plausibility of our exclusion restriction, we
proceed to a placebo test. Regressions of infant mortality, our key variable used
to disentangle between culling and scarring effects, on the same price index over
the period 1981–1996 showed that the exclusion restriction does not seem to
be at risk.18 In particular, we fix the length of the sample to 96 months, as
in the main analysis. Next, we run regressions starting on the first 96 months
of the pre-conflict sample (January 1981- December 1988). Moving each time
by one month our sliding window of 96 months from the start of the sample
17In Table A1 in the appendix we report alternative first stage results with
lagged and averaged price index.
18Infant mortality for this period is reconstructed retrospectively from the
DHS.
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until the end, we test the reduced-form relationship in 95 regressions for the
pre-conflict period.19 The results of this exercise are graphically represented in
Figures 3–5, where on the horizontal axis we represent the first month of each 96-
months sample considered, and on the vertical axis the corresponding estimated
coefficient for the reduced form. The dashed lines define the 95% confidence
interval. Figure 3 uses the full sample of boys and girls, whereas Figure 4 and
Figure 5 look at the reduced form among boys and girls only. In all three figures,
the vertical dashed line identifies the starting point of the period of investigation.
It is striking to see how the coefficients are consistently around zero in the pre-
conflict period. The negative response of girls’ mortality to mineral price shocks
is particularly strong during the period of investigation, contrasting with the
positive response for boys. Such a result is difficult to conciliate with price-
induced wealth effects, as the one suggested by the opportunity cost channel.
[FIGURE 3-5 ABOUT HERE]
5 Results
Conflict
Table 2 exhibits that at the district level, the relationship between mineral
prices and conflict events is highly significant and negative (first column and
row of Panel A, which represents our benchmark first-stage results). This sug-
gests, in line with the findings by Parker and Vadheim (2016) and Sanchez de
la Sierra (2013), that in the context of DRC the rapacity effect is not the dom-
inating mechanism mediating between mineral prices and conflict. In response
to increasing mineral prices, armed groups redirect their effort from fighting to
rent-seeking activities on the mining industry, thereby reducing the intensity of
the violence.
Parker and Vadheim (2016) clearly argue that armed groups redirect their
time allocation away from fighting to rent-seeking activities, whenever the latter
secure larger profits. In the specific context of Eastern DRC, using the words of
19So, the second regression would focus on the period February 1981- January
1989, the third on March 1981- February 1989, and so forth.
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Sanchez de la Sierra (2013), “in response to an increase in the price of coltan,
armed groups [...] start taxing and providing protection in the mines where
coltan is produced. [...] Coltan is easy to tax [...] through taxation of output
at the mines, simple to administer through custom borders, and carry minimal
administrative growth”. Similarly, he also discusses how the armed group NDC-
R, which controlled an area in Eastern DRC, sustained its local monopoly of
violence by collecting a number of mining output taxes and by issuing mining
permits.20
To test the reliability of this negative relationship, we run a set of further
robustness checks on the first stage. In the second row of column 1, we exclude
tantalum from the price index, given the alleged relevance of this mineral in
the conflict dynamics as stressed in the international press.21 Conversely, in
the third row we compute the price index only on tantalum. The fourth row
focuses on the four “conflict” minerals, as defined by United States Geological
Survey (“3TG” which stand for tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold) possibly due
to a different level of extractability.
In column 2, we restrict the analysis to the 19 districts (half of DRC districts)
hosting most of the violence in the period considered.22 It is quite remarkable
that despite the reduction in sample size, the relationship appears to be very
strong in the 19 most conflict-exposed districts. In column 3 we restrict the
analysis to the 19 districts richest in minerals (based on the price index).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In column 4–6 we focus even more on the role of tantalum in the relationship
between mineral prices and conflict. In column 4 the analysis is conducted only
on districts with tantalum deposits. Column 5 restricts the sample to the 5
districts most influenced by the tantalum price changes, and the last column
looks at the districts excluded from column 5. Although somewhat weaker, the
20Raeymaekers et al. (2008) also argues that armed groups in DRC develop
state-like governance.
21Interestingly, removing any one mineral at a time from the analysis does
not alter the results.
22Removing one district at a time does not qualitatively change the findings.
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relationship remains negative when these 5 districts are excluded.23 Hence, the
robust negative relationship does not seem to be driven by a few districts or
specific minerals, nor we find any evidence of non-monotonicity.
Adding linear district-specific time trends (Panel B) largely confirms the
pattern presented in Panel A.
We also test the first stage using a nonparametric smoother (a locally weighted
smoother, specifically the lowess estimator) on the demeaned and detrended
versions of the conflict and mineral price measures. The result of this exer-
cise, reported in Figure 6, confirms that the linear specification constitutes a
good approximation of a potentially more complex relationship.24 The negative
relationship is again confirmed using a nonparametric approach.25
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Finally, in Table A2 in the appendix we replicate our main first stage esti-
mates on two alternative datasets adopted in the related literature: the USGS
and SNL datasets.26 The sign of the coefficients remain consistently negative
across the different datasets, but it is non significant for both USGS and SNL.
The non-negligible differences in the number of mining sites across the three
datasets can account for the lack of statistical significance.
In utero mortality
Table 3 reports the results of our panel regressions on the impact of in utero
conflict exposure on the number of births. Panel A displays the results of esti-
mating the model with district and month-year fixed effects only, whereas Panel
B includes also climatic variables. In the first two columns we test the impact
on the aggregate number of births, while the next 4 columns reports the results
23Notice that tantalum districts typically also have other minerals. This ex-
plains, for instance, the negative and significant coefficient in the second row of
column 4.
24Reducing the bandwidth of this estimator from 0.80 to 0.20, and hence
producing less smoothing by focusing on closer points in the local regressions,
leaves the general trend unchanged.
25In Table A1 (Panel C) we also show that our first stage is robust to adopting
a non linear (Poisson) model.
26We thank Andreas Kotsadam for running these tests on the SNL dataset.
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specific to boys and girls. The overall number of births decreases as a result of
in utero exposure, although the coefficient is never statistically significant for
the 2SLS regressions. In line with the literature, we find an heterogeneity of
the impact across gender. In utero conflict exposure significantly reduces the
number of live male births, which is compatible with both scarring and culling
effects.27
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We find strong evidence for the nonrandom distribution of violence. Table
3 suggests a bias towards zero of ‘naive’ OLS regressions. These biases affect-
ing the OLS estimates suggest that some unobserved factors simultaneously
explain the number of conflict events by district and child mortality. A poten-
tial explanation may be that conflicts are more likely to target wealthier (and
therefore healthier or more able to cope with adverse shocks) households in a
looting-driven warfare. These biases may also arise from measurement errors.28
Following the related literature, we further investigate whether conflict expo-
sure is particularly detrimental when it occurs during the early months of preg-
nancy. In Table 4, exposure to conflict is separately captured by two variables:
conflict events during the first two trimesters of the pregnancy, and conflict
events during the last trimester.29 OLS results closely track the ones reported
27A similar test on the effect of in utero exposure to conflict on sex ratio
generates compatible results, with sex ratio decreasing in response to in utero
conflict exposure. Given the nature of our test and data, however, sex ratio
may be calculated off of too few births in several month-districts. We therefore
prefer the number of birth results. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing
out this potential issue.
28In the appendix Table A3 we report the results of several further tests in-
cluding the use of separate month and year fixed effects (column 1), the addition
of linear district-specific time trends (column 2), the inclusion of nonresident
households in the sample and the 2013 DHS (column 3), and the adoption of a
count (Poisson) model on the resident sample (column 4) and on the extended
sample including nonresidents and 2013 DHS (column 5). In Table A4 we report
the results of re-estimating the models in Table 3, using three alternative mea-
sures of conflict: the number of months featuring violence during the first year
of life (ACLED), a corresponding variable created using the UCDP dataset, and
the number of fatalities recorded by UCDP.
29The alternative strategy of capturing the first vs. the last two trimesters
produces very similar but statistically less significant coefficients.
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in Table 3, and confirm that indeed the first part of the pregnancy seems to
be more sensitive to negative shocks. IV results are also consistent with the
findings in Table 3, with conflict exposure during the first part of the pregnancy
reducing the number of boy births. However, due to a combination of the se-
lected sample (district-months in which some births occurred) and the need to
instrument for two endogenous variables, our first stage becomes very weak,
casting some doubts on the reliability of the IV results.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Table 5 presents further evidence of the gender specific impact of in utero
shock produced by our cross-sectional regression. It shows that the probability
for a newborn to be a boy is negatively affected by in utero exposure to conflict
during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.30 The positive and weakly signifi-
cant coefficient for the conflict exposure during the third trimester may suggest
the strong selection among boys occurring during the first part of the pregnancy
may reduce the vulnerability of the survived boys during the last part of the
pregnancy. But again, the low Kleibergen-Paap F statistic suggests caution in
over-interpreting these results.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Overall the results of this section are consistent with a relatively well es-
tablished result in the literature: (early) in utero exposure to negative shocks
affects male foetuses disproportionally thereby reducing the number of male
foetuses reaching birth. As argued in the introduction, since the low end of the
foetal health distribution is more populated by male individuals, this pattern
may result from two different mechanisms: the scarring effect, worsening the
health of the entire distribution causing the individuals marginally above the
survival threshold to fall below it, and the culling effect, whereby the survival
threshold itself moves upwards claiming some foetal losses among the relatively
weaker individuals. While the scarring effect would leave the affected cohort
with a relatively poorer health, the culling effect would instead imply a positive
30In the appendix Table A5 and Table A6 we report the results of adopting
alternative specifications and alternative measures of conflict, respectively.
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selection on the surviving population, i.e. the newborn should feature on aver-
age better health, particularly boys. In the next section, we estimate the impact
of conflict exposure on infant mortality (survival) rates to assess the presence
of these two mechanisms.
Infant mortality
Table 6 reports the results of our panel regressions on the effects of conflict
exposure on survival rates, for all children (columns 1–2), only boys (columns
3–4) or only girls (columns 5–6). Again, OLS results are biased towards zero.
The results are gender specific, suggesting that the live infant population may
start off with a different average health endowment. Exposure to conflict reduces
survival rates only among girls.31
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Exploiting the rich set of information in our dataset, Table 7 presents our
preferred estimates, the cross-section regressions over the sample of children
born between 1997 and 2004, for all children (columns 1–2), only boys (columns
3–4) or only girls (columns 5–6). Once more, we find strong evidence for the
nonrandom distribution of violence. Table 7 suggests a bias to zero of ‘naive’
OLS regressions.32
The results confirm a gender-specific impact of conflict episodes on child
mortality. Girls are more adversely affected by conflict than boys. According
to column 6, a change by 1 standard deviation in the number of conflict events
(that is, by about 14 conflict events) increases the probability of a girl’s dying
within the first year of life by about 8 percentage points. The magnitude of
this effect is far from trivial, inasmuch as it constitutes almost a doubling of
girls mortality (at mean value). Adding the full set of controls in Panel B of
Table 7 leaves the coefficients of interest virtually unchanged (slight increase of
31In the appendix Table A7 and Table A8 we show the robustness of our
results in Table 6 to alternative specifications and the adoption of alternative
measures of conflict, respectively.
32In the appendix Table A9 and Table A10 we show the robustness of our
results on girls’ mortality rate in Table 7 to alternative specifications and the
adoption of alternative measures of conflict, respectively.
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the coefficient and the power of our instrument).33 That is very reassuring with
respect to the exclusion restriction. As discussed in the section 4, our exclusion
restriction is particularly endangered by the potential income effect of mineral
prices. Therefore, conditional on household wealth, the exclusion restriction is
more likely to hold.34
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
We next address more directly the potential existence of income effects due
to mineral price changes by removing from our sample children born in the
areas surrounding mines. In Appendix Table A11 we replicate the instrumental
variable estimations of Table 7 excluding the sample of children located within 10
(Panel A), 20 (Panel B) and 30 kilometers (Panel C) from the mineral deposits.
The results in Table A11 remain qualitatively identical to the ones in Table
7 suggesting that our exclusion restriction is not violated by income effects.
Indeed, since households located further than 30 kilometers from the mineral
deposits are very unlikely to participate in any way to the mining activities,
income effects cannot explain the impact of conflict on infant mortality.
Overall, the above results suggest that the male and female infant popula-
tions generated amidst violence start their life with a different average health
endowment, which is only consistent with the presence of culling effect. While
a large share of relatively weak male foetuses are lost during pregnancy, thereby
generating a positively selected male cohort at birth, the corresponding effect
33For presentation purposes, coefficients of control variables are not shown
here. Being part of a multiple birth and being a first child increase mortality.
On the contrary, and in line with the literature, mothers education and wealth
decrease infant mortality (see, for instance, Behrman and Wolfe 1987; Strauss
and Thomas 1995).
34As a further test, we apply the method proposed by Oster (2016) to assess
the risk of omitted variable bias in our second-stage regression. Assuming the
R-squared value generated from a mother fixed effect regression (with controls)
as the variation that could be hypothetically explained by the full set of observed
and unobserved factors, we obtain a degree of selection (δ in Oster 2016) of 3.59.
Such degree of selection suggests that the variation in unobservables should be
more than 3 times higher than the variation in treatment due to observables
to explain away the result (under a full hypothesized model). Such a value is
well above the suggested value of one above which results could be considered
as robust.
26
is much weaker among girls. Assuming that local violence affects similarly live
boys and girls, the different mortality rate can be considered evidence of a dif-
ferent average health endowment.35 As in Valente (2015), we cannot rule out
that some scarring effect operated due to in utero effect. However, the lack of
impact of conflict exposure on boys suggests that the net effect of the scarring
and culling mechanisms produced a positively selected male population.
6 Threats to our identification strategy
In this section we address two main threats to our identification strategy. We
first assess endogenous fertility decisions during the conflict in DRC, and then
the extent to which migration may threaten the validity of our results.
Endogenous fertility
The foetal origin literature considers fertility decisions as a serious threat to all
estimates of the impact of early negative shocks in life on later outcomes. If
the negative shock affects the fertility decisions of mothers differently depend-
ing on some specific mother/household characteristics, then any estimate of the
consequences of the shock would be biased. For instance, if educated mothers
react to a conflict by reducing their fertility decisions, then the infant popu-
lation generated during the conflict may feature poorer health or educational
outcomes because of the different mothers’ composition or characteristics rather
than because of the conflict exposure. Notice first that it is very unlikely that
such bias concerns the unbalanced effect across gender we presented in the pre-
vious section. Next, the stability of our estimated coefficients for girls’ mortality
35In Table A12 in the appendix we test for the alternative explanation which
could generate differential infant mortality rates across gender, namely gender
discrimination. We interact our conflict exposure variable with a number of
household/mother characteristics which have been flagged in the literature as
potentially exacerbate female negative discrimination, i.e. female headed house-
hold, widow mother, number of sisters, number of brothers, and son preference
(Thomas 1990, 1994; Duflo 2003, 2012; Morduch 2000; Akresh and Edmonds
2011; Jayachandran and Kuziemko 2011). We find no evidence consistent with
gender discrimination behavior.
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when we include household characteristics such as the number of siblings or the
household size is a first signal of the non-selected nature of our sample. Month
fixed effects and the use of district-specific trends also deals with fertility trends
and seasonality. Moreover, as Valente (2015) argues, it is unlikely that parents
are able to predict month-to-month variations in violence when making their
fertility decision. We nevertheless formally address this concern proposing two
alternative strategies.
First, in our panel regressions we restrict our analysis to the sample of chil-
dren of mothers who were pregnant at least twice during the period considered,
facing different exposure to conflict across the two pregnancy, thereby reducing
the concerns about composition effects.36 Similarly, we include in our cross-
sectional model a set of mother fixed effects.37 Intuitively, we compare the
mortality of siblings differently exposed to conflict, by taking account of their
shared environment and common genetics.
Table 8, following this strategy, confirms the pattern presented in Table 3
and Table 5 concerning the number of male/female births. Although within-
mother variation is too limited to estimate the trimester-stratified exposure to
conflict, we confirm a negative coefficient of conflicts occurring in the first and
second trimester of pregnancy on the probability of a male birth.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The gender imbalance in infant mortality is further confirmed in Table 9.38
The magnitudes of the effect remain similar. As in the previous specifications,
the mother fixed effects results do not depend on the inclusion of climate and
individual characteristics (Panel B of Table 9).
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
36A similar strategy has been adopted by Herna´ndez-Julia´n et al. (2014). No-
tice that while this sample restriction addresses composition effects, it somehow
reduces the external validity of our findings.
37In order to ease the estimation process, we partial out each variable with
the series of all the fixed effects.
38The p-values of the coefficients for conflict events in column 4 of Table 9
are 0.101 (Panel A) and 0.117 (Panel B), respectively.
28
Second, we follow the common approach in assessing the characteristics of
mothers who were exposed to violence before conceptions (3 months, 6 months,
9 months, 12 months), during pregnancy or during the first 12 months of life
(see e.g. Akresh et al. 2011, Valente 2015, Almond and Mazumber 2011).
We consider the following characteristics: the wealth index, household size,
whether it is a female-headed household, mother’s education level, the number
of births, number of years of education, and whether the mother is a non-resident
(migrant). In Table 10 we report the results of this exercise. With the exception
of mother’s education, exposure to conflict is uncorrelated with mothers’ and
households’ characteristics. The fact that high-educated women are more likely
to become pregnant when exposed to violence before conception suggests that
we may underestimate the effect of violence on child mortality.39
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
Another exception is the negative correlation between conflicts before con-
ception and the probability to be a migrant. We are less likely to encounter
migrant mothers in district highly exposed to conflicts prior to the conception
of the child. Such correlation further motivates the exclusion of the non-resident
households from our main analysis. We further discuss the issue below.
Migration
Like endogenous fertility decisions, migration may also bias our results. If,
for instance, the wealthier households are able to move to safer locations dur-
ing conflict, then the treated group would be constituted by poorer household
which may display higher mortality rates, irrespective of their conflict expo-
sure. Taking seriously this issue, we restrict to the sample of resident only in
our analysis.40
39Such unexpected selection based on high education echoes the results found
by Akresh et al. (2011) in the case of Ethiopia.
40The inclusion of non residents exacerbates the problems posed by migrations
which could bias our results. We also chose not to include in the main analysis
the 2013 DHS as it does not record whether an household is resident of migrant,
which is all the more worrying in the context of DRC, Rwandan and Burundian
civil wars, which triggered considerable migration in the area studied.
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Descriptive statistics show that while the 5 districts most prone to conflict
account for 26.4% of the total number of households, they represent precisely 1/3
of all the migrant households. In addition to that, the proportion of migrant
households in the whole sample is 18.4% while it is 22.1% in these particu-
lar districts. It therefore seems that even though these districts accommodate
proportionally more migrants than the others, they seem to move inside these
districts.41
Still, to increase the confidence in our results, we formally assess the impact
of migration. First, similarly to what we do to assess endogenous fertility, we
study the characteristics of non resident mothers in our sample (see e.g. Akresh
et al. 2011, Valente 2015, Almond and Mazumber 2011). Table 11, which
displays the results of this exercise, indicates that residents and non-residents
are very similar in terms of observed characteristics with one notable exception.
Nonresident households are smaller in size. The results in Table 11, together
with the results in Table 10 concerning migrants support our choice of restricting
the main analysis to the resident population only.42
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
41This is also confirmed in the series of country reports released by the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre during the crisis available at: www.internal-
displacement.org/database/country/?iso3=COD. For instance, the February
2000 report discussing the pattern of displacement argues that the vast ma-
jority of IDPs remain in proximity to their places of origin, “which makes them
prone to be subjected to the same hazards and abuses that caused them to flee
in the first place” (IDMC 2000, p. 44).
42In appendix we report the results of a further simulation exercise addressing
migration. We simulate four scenarios randomly allocating migrant mothers to:
(i) any of the 38 districts; (ii) one of the 19 most conflict intensive districts;
(iii) one of the 10 most conflict intensive districts; and (iv) one of the 5 most
conflict intensive districts, following the logic that most migration may have
occurred due to ongoing violence. For each scenario, after having reallocated the
migrating mothers we remove district/mother fixed effects and run 1000 2SLS
regressions of conflict on girls mortality. The results of this exercise broadly
confirms our main results: girls mortality is positively affected by the violence.
The distribution of the coefficients of interest in these 1000 2sls regressions are
plotted in Figures A3-A4 displayed in appendix.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the impact of the armed conflict aﬄicting the DRC
from 1997 to 2004 on in utero selection and infant mortality. We show that
in utero exposure to conflict affects negatively the number of male (but not
female) birth. According to the recent literature on in utero selection, this may
result from two effects: culling and scarring. Based on the analysis of post natal
infant mortality, we argue that culling effects may have positively selected the
male population of newborn. Indeed, we find that conflict exposure increases
infant mortality only among girls. This pattern is robust to many different
specifications, controlling for district and month fixed effects, rainfall anomalies,
and mother fixed effects. Assuming that local violence affects similarly live boys
and girls, the different mortality rate can be considered as evidence of a better
health endowment among male newborns.
This study differs from existing microlevel studies in a major way. Relying
on a credible instrumental variable approach, we control for the nonrandom
timing and location of conflict violence. This is particularly relevant when we
exploit within-district variations inasmuch as we show that our instrumental
variables results significantly differ from our ordinary least squares findings.
Such contrasting results raise some concerns about potential bias in the existing
studies relying on geographical variation in exposure to conflicts.
Overall, and in line with recent findings in the in utero selection literature,
our results strongly suggest that more attention should be paid to understanding
possible selection in utero in studies assessing the impact of early shocks in life
(Catalano and Bruckner 2006; Catalano et al. 2008; Sanders and Stoeker 2015;
Valente 2015).
Our analysis also delivers a critical policy recommendation. Gender-specific
warfare damages have sometimes led scholars and policymakers to call for gender-
based targeted interventions. Although they may be grounded on good motives
and may help in reducing gender discrimination in general, our study warns
that these policies may miss their targets if they fail to account for the possible
selection in utero. In other words, despite providing some evidence of gender
imbalances in infant mortality, our paper suggests that any policy should be
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drawn on a sound understanding of the sources of such gender bias. As biolog-
ical factors in utero are found to be a prominent explanation, our paper resets
the priority to policies aiming at enhancing the resilience of (pregnant) women
to violent experiences. Policies ensuring high coverage of multiple micronutri-
ent supplementation and other nutrition-sensitive programs directly addressing
pregnant women (like cash transfers), family planning to delay the age of first
pregnancy, or educational interventions designed to increase spacing between
births may therefore all prove comparatively more effective in reducing infant
mortality in times of violence than policies targeting gender discrimination dur-
ing the first year of life (Black et al. 2013; Bhutta et al. 2013; Ruel and
Alderman 2013; WHO 2014).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
District level:
Number of births 2,598 3.691 3.916 0.0297 32.534
Number of boy births 2,598 1.834 2.386 0 20.366
Number of girl births 2,598 1.857 2.492 0 28.760
Survival rate 2,598 0.893 0.2372 0 1
Boy survival rate 2,064 0.885 0.270 0 1
Girl survival rate 2,007 0.905 0.250 0 1
Conflict events (12m) 2,598 5.955 12.890 0 118
Conflict events in utero (9m) 2,598 4.392 10.073 0 103
Conflict events in utero (1st and 2nd trimesters) 2,598 2.960 7.328 0 76
Conflict events in utero (3rd trimester) 2,598 1.431 4.237 0 53
Price Index (12m) 2,598 422.240 595.557 0 3074.484
Individual level:
Boys birth 9,496 0.504 0.500 0 1
Infant mortality 10,397 0.107 0.310 0 1
Boy Mortality 5,242 0.117 0.321 0 1
Girl Mortality 5,155 0.0976 0.297 0 1
Conflict events (12m) 10,397 7.877 14.470 0 118
Conflict events in utero (9m) 9,496 5.973 11.238 0 103
Conflict events in utero (1st and 2nd trimesters) 9,496 4.045 8.415 0 76
Conflict events in utero (3rd trimester) 9,496 1.928 4.825 0 53
Price Index (12m) 10,397 495.967 630.795 0 3074.484
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Table 2: Panel regressions on the impact of mineral prices on conflict
Dependent variable: Conflict events
5 districts with most Districts excluded
Districts included: All Most violent 19 Minerals richest 19 TA districts TA price variation in column (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No trend
Price index -0.012*** -0.0154*** -0.0151*** -0.0218*** -0.0415** -0.00406
(0.00391) (0.0048) (0.00496) (0.00393) (0.0108) (0.00251)
F-statistic 9.47 10.30 9.30 30.70 14.90 2.62
Price index - No TA -0.00618** -0.00874** -0.00896** -0.00755 -0.039* -0.00441*
(0.00256) (0.00343) (0.00312) (0.0107) (0.0166) (0.00251)
F-statistic 5.85 6.50 8.24 0.50 5.55 3.09
TA price index -0.0298*** -0.0303*** -0.0322*** -0.0309*** -0.0445** 0.144
(0.00554) (0.00619) (0.00596) (0.00591) (0.0124) (0.118)
F-statistic 28.80 24.00 29.10 27.30 12.90 1.51
3TG price index -0.0237*** -0.0236*** -0.0256*** -0.0243*** -0.0341*** 0.00864
(0.00362) (0.00403) (0.004) (0.00388) (0.00681) (0.037)
F-statistic 43.10 34.50 41.20 39.30 25.00 0.05
Panel B: Linear trends
Price index -0.0167*** -0.0189*** -0.0177*** -0.0251*** -0.0292 -0.00638**
(0.00358) (0.00315) (0.00353) (0.0036) (0.0144) (0.00298)
F-statistic 21.70 36.00 25.10 48.50 4.10 4.60
Price index - No TA -0.0124*** -0.0156*** -0.0116*** -0.0286*** -0.025 -0.00719**
(0.00395) (0.00424) (0.00394) (0.00939) (0.0251) (0.00276)
F-statistic 9.90 13.50 8.65 9.26 0.99 6.76
TA price index -0.0245*** -0.0244*** -0.0266*** -0.0256*** -0.0362*** 0.152
(0.00298) (0.00371) (0.00344) (0.00339) (0.00759) (0.117)
F-statistic 67.50 43.30 59.80 57.00 22.80 1.69
3TG price index -0.0251*** -0.0246*** -0.0263*** -0.0259*** -0.0234 0.0237
(0.00303) (0.00335) (0.00337) (0.00339) (0.0164) (0.0438)
F-statistic 68.80 54.20 60.70 58.30 2.05 0.29
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 3648 1824 1824 2112 480 3168
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; F-stats in square parentheses; FE = fixed effects; TA = tantalum; 3TG: Tantalum, Tin,
Tungsten, Gold. For each panel, in the second row we exclude TA from the price index; in the third row we compute the price index
only on tantalum; rows 4-6 replicate rows 1-3 but predict conflict in a 12-month period based on the sum of the price variations over
a 12-month period. In column 2, we restrict the analysis to the 19 districts hosting most of the violence in the period considered; in
column 3 we restrict the analysis to the 19 districts richest in minerals; in column 4 the analysis is conducted only on districts with
tantalum deposits; in column 5 we restrict the sample to the 5 districts most influenced by the tantalum price changes; column 6 looks
at the districts excluded from column 5. Panel B includes linear district-specific time trends.
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Table 3: Panel regression of the impact of in utero exposure to conflict on number of births
Dependent variable: Number of births
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0106 -0.0442 -0.0062 -0.019 0.0043 0.0252
(0.0064) (0.033) (0.0028)** (0.0108)* (0.0061) (0.0263)
[-0.032, -0.0000]** [-0.13, 0.027] [-0.013, 0.0033] [-0.042, 0.002]* [-0.025, 0.0059] [-0.09, 0.034]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 21.30 21.30 21.30
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0107 -0.0457 -0.0063 -0.0208 0.0043 0.0249
(0.0069) (0.0331) (0.0028)** (0.0118)* (0.0067) (0.0253)
[-0.033, 0.0012] [-0.13, 0.029] [-0.012, 0.0034] [-0.046, 0.0025]* [-0.027, 0.0079] [-0.088, 0.034]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 20.30 20.30 20.30
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated
on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by
wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Climatic controls
include rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table 4: Panel regression of the impact of in utero exposure to conflict by trimester on number of births
Dependent variable: Number of births
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0142 -0.0257 -0.0088 -0.0709 -0.0054 0.0452
(1st and 2nd trimesters) (0.012) (0.052) (0.0048)* (0.0477) (0.0089) (0.0524)
[-0.053, 0.01] [-0.15, 0.093] [-0.023, 0.001]* [-0.24, -0.0023]** [-0.034, 0.011] [-0.041, 0.25]
Conflict Events in utero -0.0046 -0.0811 -0.0012 0.0857 -0.0034 -0.167
(3rd trimester) (0.0212) (0.151) (0.0112) (0.106) (0.0127) (0.137)
[-0.059, 0.044] [-0.49, 0.37] [-0.026, 0.033] [-0.043, 0.228] [-0.033, 0.025] [-0.406, 0.069]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 1.66 1.66 1.66
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0149 -0.0227 -0.0088 -0.0713 -0.0061 0.0487
(1st and 2nd trimesters) (0.012) (0.0492) (0.0048)* (0.0438) (0.0091) (0.0494)
[-0.055, 0.0087] [-0.14, 0.09] [-0.023, 0.0012]* [-0.21, -0.0051]** [-0.036, 0.01] [-0.038, 0.23]
Conflict Events in utero -0.0034 -0.0911 -0.0015 0.0788 -0.0019 -0.17
(3rd trimester) (0.0214) (0.144) (0.0114) (0.097) (0.013) (0.132)
[-0.057, 0.044] [-0.48, 0.3] [-0.027, 0.034] [-0.079, 0.55] [-0.031, 0.029] [-0.75, 0.053]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 1.96 1.96 1.96
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,621
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated
on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced
by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Climatic
controls include rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least
squares.
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Table 5: The impact of in utero exposure to conflict by trimester on the probability of boy birth
Dependent variable: Boy birth
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events in utero (1st and 2nd trimesters) -0.0005 -0.0127
(0.0010) (0.0087)
[-0.0023, 0.0032] [-0.041, -0.0001]**
Conflict Events in utero (3rd trimester) 0.0002 0.0262
(0.0013) (0.0171)
[-0.0019, 0.005] [-0.0037, 0.099]*
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 2.45
Panel B: Full set of controls
Conflict Events in utero (1st and 2nd trimesters) -0.0005 -0.0138
(0.0011) (0.0083)*
[-0.0026, 0.0036] [-0.041, -0.0016]**
Conflict Events in utero (3rd trimester) -0.0003 0.0266
(0.0014) (0.0166)
[-0.0026, 0.0048] [-0.0044, 0.097]*
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 2.63
District FE  
Month-year FE  
N 9,496 9,496
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district
level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-
statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals
produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution
of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Full set of controls include a dummy being part
of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters
alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the
household, the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies,
temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS =
two-stage least squares.
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Table 6: Panel regression of the impact of in utero exposure to conflict on survival rates
Dependent variable: Survival rate
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events 0.0001 -0.0033 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0045
(0.0004) (0.0031) (0.0006) (0.0045) (0.0008) (0.0018)**
[-0.0011, 0.0011] [-0.016, 0.0032] [-0.0007, 0.0024] [-0.022, 0.01] [-0.0026, 0.0008] [-0.0098, -0.0011]**
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 8.97 5.23 8.00
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events 0.0002 -0.0036 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0040*
(0.0004) (0.0036) (0.0006) (0.0051) (0.0008) (0.0023)
[-0.001, 0.0015] [-0.02, 0.0041] [-0.0006, 0.0026] [-0.0099, 0.0076] [-0.0025, 0.0010] [-0.011, 0.0005]*
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 11.00 6.29 9.33
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated on
the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by wild
bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. All regressions control for
in utero exposure to conflict. Climatic controls include rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least
squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table 7: The impact of conflict on infant mortality
Dependent variable: Infant mortality
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0042 0.0004 0.0055
(0.0004) (0.0032) (0.0004)*** (0.0044) (0.0009) (0.0035)
[-0.0013, 0.0003] [-0.0044, 0.0064] [-0.0024, -0.0008]*** [-0.0142, 0.0060] [-0.0011, 0.00201] [0.0006, 0.01036]**
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 6.68 6.53 6.77
Panel B: Full set of controls
Conflict Events -0.0005 0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0020 0.0004 0.0061
(0.0004) (0.0036) (0.0004)*** (0.0046) (0.0009) (0.0038)
[-0.0013, 0.0003] [-0.0030, 0.0078] [-0.0021, -0.0007]*** [-0.0110, 0.0071] [-0.0011, 0.0020] [0.0010, 0.0107]**
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 7.93 7.80 8.17
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 10,397 10,397 5,242 5,242 5,155 5,155
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated on the
empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap
(percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Full set of controls include a dummy being
part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education,
a measure of the wealth of the household, the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and
the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table 8: The impact of in utero exposure to conflict on gender specific natality–mother fixed effect sample
Dependent variable: Number of births Boy birth
Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0043 -0.0213 -0.0035 -0.0207
(0.0023)* (0.0089)** (0.0055) (0.0216)
[-0.0094, 0.0036] [-0.041, -0.0055]** [-0.022, 0.0065] [-0.081, 0.029]
Conflict in utero (1st and 2nd trimesters) 0.0001 -0.0030
(0.0012) (0.0168)
[-0.0021, 0.0024] [-0.0336, 0.0305]
Conflit in utero (3rd trimester) 0.0007 0.0088
(0.0012) (0.0269)
[-0.0016, 0.0030] [-0.0389, 0.0561]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 24.1 24.1 2.50
Panel B: Including controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0044 -0.0236 -0.0036 -0.0209
(0.0024)* (0.0093)** (0.0060) (0.022)
[-0.0093, 0.0038] [-0.044, -0.0067]** [-0.024, 0.0076] [-0.083, 0.032]
Conflict in utero (1st and 2nd trimesters) -0.0011 -0.0061
(0.0009) (0.0145)
[-0.0027, 0.0006] [-0.0323, 0.0218]
Conflict in utero (3rd trimester) 0.0008 0.0185
(0.0013) (0.0251)
[-0.0016, 0.0035] [-0.0244, 0.0609]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 22.20 22.20 3.00
District FE      
Month-year FE      
Mother FE  
N 2481 2481 2481 2481 8054 8054
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated on the empirical
distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t
method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Analysis restricted to the sample of mothers having at least 2
children during the period considered. Panel B adds climatic controls in columns 1-4 and the full set of controls in columns 5-6. Climatic controls include
rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. Full set of controls include a dummy being part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being
the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the household, the
household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least squares;
2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table 9: The impact of conflict on infant mortality–mother fixed effect sample
Dependent variable: Survival rate Infant mortality
Boys Girls Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events -0.00003 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0055 -0.0014 -0.0036 -0.0011 0.0071
(0.0007) (0.0040) (0.0007) (0.0032)* (0.0008)* (0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0048)
[-0.0014, 0.0025] [-0.017, 0.0095] [-0.0019, 0.0013] [-0.015, 0.00099] [-0.0029, 0.0002]* [-0.0110, 0.0035] [-0.0027, 0.0005] [-0.0004, 0.01402]*
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 5.71 7.55 8.16 9.93
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events -0.00005 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0053 -0.0014 -0.0040 -0.0002 0.0075
(0.0007) (0.0042) (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0007)* (0.0032) (0.0004) (0.0047)
[-0.0014, 0.0028] [-0.013, 0.008] [-0.002, 0.0015] [-0.018, 0.0011] [-0.0027, 0.00002]** [-0.01134, 0.0035] [-0.0010, 0.0005] [0.0012, 0.0135]*
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 4.61 6.56 8.5 12.2
Mother FE    
Month-year FE      
N 1921 1921 1870 1870 4491 4491 4362 4362
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics;
correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of
coefficients reported in squared brackets. Analysis restricted to the sample of mothers having at least 2 children during the period considered. Panel B adds climatic controls and in
utero exposure to conflict in columns 1-4 and the full set of controls in columns 5-8. Climatic controls include rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. Full
set of controls include a dummy being part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s
education, a measure of the wealth of the household, the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index.
OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares. OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table 10: Endogenous fertility - conflict exposure and the characteristics of pregnant women
Wealth HH Female Number Education Education Education Years of Age of
Dependent variable: Index Size Headed HH of Births Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Education HH Head Migrant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Conflict Events (12 months 9.913 -0.053 0.008 -0.449 -0.024 0.004 0.017 0.271 -0.561 -0.007*
before conception) [-1.744, 44.126] [-0.275, 0.115] [-0.012, 0.045] [-2, 0.921] [-0.206, 0.018] [-0.009, 0.023] [-0.014, 0.091] [-0.150, 1.816] [-2.649, 0.342] [-0.015, 0.000]
Conflict Events (9 months 13.933 -0.074 0.009 -0.515 -0.034 0.006 0.023 0.378 -0.756 -0.009
before conception) [-8.114, 68.043] [-0.367, 0.161] [-0.016, 0.060] [-2.941, 1.614] [-0.180, 0.018] [-0.012, 0.034] [-0.017, 0.144] [-0.172, 3.258] [-4.375, 0.446] [-0.021, 0.000]
Conflict Events (6 months 21.992 -0.103 0.016 -0.987 -0.058 0.011 0.040 0.638 -1.066 -0.013**
before conception) [-2.702, 197.318] [-0.596, 0.395] [-0.024, 0.195] [-6.95, 2.743] [-0.407, 0.026] [-0.021, 0.070] [-0.024, 0.726] [-2.225, -0.833] [-29.74, 0.714] [-0.032, 0.001]
Conflict Events (3 months 44.556 -0.3358 0.0464 -1.286 -0.1329 0.0299 0.0866 1.471 -2.952 -0.0257
before conception) [-23.781, 201.689] [-1.342, 2.632] [-0.050, 0.189] [-14.130, 6.982] [-0.837, 0.048] [-0.074, 0.151] [-0.047, 0.420] [-14.13, 6.982] [-9.861, 1.089] [-0.071, 0.009]
Conflict Events 3.758 -0.015 0.004 -0.179 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.109 -0.175 -0.000
(in utero) [-1.223, 12.601] [-0.111, 0.107] [-0.005, 0.013] [-1.045, 0.536] [-0.033, 0.009] [-0.011, 0.012] [-0.005, 0.021] [-0.059, 0.326] [-0.593, 0.173] [-0.007, 0.006]
Conflict Events (during first -0.469 -0.015 -0.002 0.054 -0.003* 0.004* 0.00005 -0.0004 -0.117 0.0008
12 months of life) [-1.236, 0.236] [-0.044, 0.009] [-0.006, 0.001] [-0.133, 0.281] [-0.008, 0.000] [-0.000, 0.010] [-0.003, 0.003] [-0.025, 0.028] [-0.289, 0.016] [-0.001, 0.004]
District FE          
Month-year FE          
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals
produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients. Each coefficient is produced with a separate 2SLS regression, using the price index as
excluded instrument for the various conflict variables.
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Table 11: Migration and the characteristics of mothers
Wealth HH Female Number Education Education Education Years of Age of
Dependent variable: Index Size Headed HH of Births Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Education HH Head
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Non-resident -3.897 -0.520*** 0.010 -1.486* -0.034 0.0001 0.034 0.417 -0.429
[-12354, 5046] [-0.743, -0.268] [-0.034, 0.055] [-3.423, 0.112] [-0.105, 0.043] [-0.071, 0.072] [-0.053, 0.128] [-0.357, 1.317] [-1.585, 0.892]
District FE         
Month-year FE         
N 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only;
Standard errors clustered at the district level and confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients.
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Figure 1: Total conflict events by district in Democratic Republic of Congo, 1997–2004
Source: ACLED.
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Figure 2: Total mineral deposits by district in Democratic Republic of Congo
Source: Royal Museum for Central Africa of Tervuren, Belgium.
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Figure 3: Placebo test on full sample
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Figure 4: Placebo test on boys sample
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Figure 5: Placebo test on girls sample
59
Figure 6: Lowess estimation of first stage
60
Appendix
Figure A1: Trends of average price index and conflict events.
The figure reports the average price index, the average price index computed on the 3TG (tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold)
minerals only, and the average level of Conflict Events over the period considered.
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Figure A2: Price index and conflict events across four districts.
The figure reports the average price index and the average level of Conflict Events over the period considered for 4 districts
troubled by the conflict.
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Figure A3: Migration Simulation–district FE
These boxplots represent distribution plots of 1000 estimated beta according to different scenarios: 1) all migrating mothers
are randomly allocated to one district of origin; 2) all migrating mothers are randomly allocated to one of the 19 most conflict
intensive districts; 3) all migrating mothers are randomly allocated to one of the 10 most conflict intensive districts; 4) all
migrating mothers are randomly allocated to one of the 5 most conflict intensive districts. Bold vertical lines (inside the
box) represent the median beta, coloured boxes show the interquartile range (25%-75%), and whiskers indicate the 5th–95th
percentile of simulations. After having reallocated the migrating mothers for the non resident sample, we remove district fixed
effects and run 2SLS regressions of conflict on girls mortality.
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Figure A4: Migration Simulation–mothers FE
These boxplots represent distribution plots of 1000 estimated beta according to different scenarios: 1) all migrating mothers
are randomly allocated to one district of origin; 2) all migrating mothers are randomly allocated to one of the 19 most conflict
intensive districts; 3) all migrating mothers are randomly allocated to one of the 10 most conflict intensive districts; 4) all
migrating mothers are randomly allocated to one of the 5 most conflict intensive districts. Bold vertical lines (inside the
box) represent the median beta, coloured boxes show the interquartile range (25%-75%), and whiskers indicate the 5th–95th
percentile of simulations. After having reallocated the migrating mothers for the non resident sample, we remove mothers fixed
effects and run 2SLS regressions of conflict on girls mortality.
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Table A1: Alternative first stage specifications
Dependent variable: Conflict events
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Lagged price index
Price Index -0.0117*** -0.0121*** -0.0123*** -0.0124***
(0.00391) (0.00408) (0.00423) (0.00437)
Lag t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4
Panel B: Averaged price index
Price Index -0.0119*** -0.0121*** -0.0123*** -0.0125***
(0.00401) (0.00412) (0.00423) (0.00435)
Averaged periods t-1 to t-2 t-1 to t-3 t-1 to t-4 t-1 to t-5
Panel C: Poisson model
Price Index -0.00131*** -0.00126***
(0.00006) (0.00007)
Linear trend 
District FE    
Month-year FE    
N 3,648 3,648 3,648 3,648
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Panel A reports the relationship between
conflict events and several lagged versions of the price index, whereas Panel B reports
the relationship between conflict events and several averaged versions of the price
index. Panel C reports the relationship between conflict events and the price index
using a Poisson model.
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Table A2: First stage specifications with alternative conflict measures
Dependent variable: Conflict events
RMCA USGS SNL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price index -0.0120*** -0.0167*** -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0013
(0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0034)
Price index - no TA -0.0062** -0.0124*** -0.0021 -0.0030 -0.0037 -0.0013
(0.0026) (0.0040) (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0034)
TA price index -0.0298*** -0.0245*** -0.0033 -0.0028 - -
(0.0056) (0.0030) (0.0079) (0.0063) (-) (-)
3TG price index -0.0237*** -0.0251*** -0.0052 -0.0057 -0.0255 -0.0646*
(0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0198) (0.0330)
Linear trends   
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 3,648 3,648 3,648 3,648 3,648 3,648
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; RMCA denotes the Royal Museum for Central
Africa dataset; USGS denotes the US Geologocal Survey dataset; SNL denotes the SNL
dataset; TA stands for tantalum; 3TG: Tantalum, Tin, Tungsten, Gold; FE = fixed effects.
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Table A3: The impact of conflict on the number of boy births–alternative specifications
Dependent variable: Number of boy births
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0219 -0.017 0.0314 -0.0326 0.0191
(0.0111)** (0.0129) (0.0461) (0.0127)** (0.0403)
[-0.045, -0.0001]** [-0.048, 0.013] [-0.05, 0.16] [-0.064, 0.021] [-0.065, 0.17]
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0237 -0.0227 0.0296 -0.0343 -0.0090
(0.0122)* (0.0147) (0.0456) (0.0114)*** (0.0327)
[-0.049, 0.0009]* [-0.058, 0.012] [-0.053, 0.15] [-0.059, 0.011]* [-0.074, 0.049]
Month FE 
Year FE 
Linear trends 
Includes nonresidents & DHS 2013  
Poisson model  
Month-year FE    
N 2,598 2,598 3,168 2,598 3,168
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values
are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95%
confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients
reported in squared brackets. Climatic controls include rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index.
OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table A4: The impact of in utero exposure to conflict on the number of birth - alternative conflict measures
Dependent variable: Number of births
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Number of months with conflict (ACLED) -0.0617 -0.313 0.0014 -0.135 -0.063 -0.178
in utero (0.0356)* (0.223) (0.0249) (0.0761)* (0.0315)* (0.179)
[-0.14, 0.0068]* [-0.86, 0.19] [-0.046, 0.055] [-0.29, 0.015]* [-0.14, -0.0019]** [-0.62, 0.24]
Number of months with conflict (UCDP) -0.0098 -10.36 -0.0154 -0.582 0.0056 -0.774
in utero (0.0434) (10.3) (0.0358) (0.492) (0.0429) (0.937)
[ -0.1, 0.11] [-3.5571, 0.8936] [-0.083, 0.084] [-1.3132, 0.1975] [-0.13, 0.1] [-2.4820, 0.9547]
Number of casualties (UCDP) -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0007
in utero (0.0001)*** (0.0009) (0.00006)*** (0.0003)* (0.00008) (0.0007)
[-0.0008, -0.00004]** [-0.0036, 0.0007] [-0.0004, 0.00006]* [-0.0013, -0.000008]** [-0.0005, -0.00001]** [-0.0026, 0.0010]
Panel B: Climatic controls
Number of months with conflict (ACLED) -0.064 -0.333 0.0003 -0.152 -0.0643 -0.181
in utero (0.0373)* (0.229) (0.0252) (0.0859)* (0.0339)* (0.176)
[-0.15, 0.007]* [-0.89, 0.21] [-0.046, 0.056] [-0.33, 0.018]* [-0.15, 0.0046]* [-0.62, 0.25]
Number of months with conflict (UCDP) -0.0103 -10.29 -0.0159 -0.598 0.0056 -0.696
in utero (0.0405) (10.19) (0.036) (0.475) (0.0417) (0.825)
[-0.1,0.094] [-3.3557, 0.7888] [-0.085, 0.086] [-1.3490, 0.2058] [-0.12, 0.084] [-2.2193, 0.8440]
Number of casualties (UCDP) -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0007
in utero (0.0001)*** (0.0009) (0.00007)*** (0.0003)* (0.0001) (0.0007)
[-0.0009, -0.00006]** [-0.0039, 0.0007] [-0.0004, 0.00007] [-0.0015, 0.000003]** [-0.0006, 0.00003] [-0.0027, 0.0009]
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598
Notes: Each coefficient results from a separate regression. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses;
P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by
wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Climatic controls include rainfall anomalies,
temperature anomalies, and the malaria index.
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Table A5: The impact of conflict by trimester on the probability of being a boy at birth–alternative specifications
Dependent variable: Boy birth
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0081 -0.0082 -0.0057 -0.0054 -0.0009
(1st and 2nd trimesters) (0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0063) (0.0028)* (0.0008)
[-0.026, 0.002] [-0.028, 0.0043] [-0.029, 0.0061] [-0.018, 0.0021] [-0.0046, 0.002]
Conflict Events in utero 0.0165 0.0212 0.0158 -0.0028 -0.0006
(3rd trimester) (0.0108) (0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0052) (0.0039)
[-0.0057, 0.061] [-0.0035, 0.077] [-0.0074, 0.059] [-0.012, 0.014] [-0.012, 0.018]
Panel B: Full set of controls
Conflict Events in utero -0.0093 -0.0090 -0.0057 -0.0041 -0.0013
(1st and 2nd trimesters) (0.0055)* (0.0064) (0.0059) (0.0027) (0.0007)*
[-0.026, 0.0003] [-0.025, 0.0024] [-0.027, 0.0052] [-0.016, 0.0051] [-0.0038, 0.0009]
Conflict Events in utero 0.0177 0.0211 0.0144 -0.0030 -0.0016
(3rd trimester) (0.0111) (0.0138) (0.0111) (0.0043) (0.0037)
[-0.0063, 0.063]* [-0.0054, 0.073] [-0.0075, 0.051] [-0.011, 0.014] [-0.013, 0.018]
Month FE 
Year FE 
Linear trends 
Includes nonresidents & DHS 2013  
Poisson model  
Month-year FE    
N 9496 9496 25829 9496 25829
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values
are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95%
confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients
reported in squared brackets. Full set of controls include a dummy being part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first
child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth
of the household, the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and
the malaria index. 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table A6: The impact of in utero exposure to conflict on the probability of a boy birth - alternative conflict measures
Dependent variable: Boy birth
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict (1st and 2nd trimesters) -0.4166 -0.1983 -0.0026
[-0.778, -0.055]** [-0.433, 0.037]* [-0.005, -0.000]**
Conflict (3rd trimester) 1.5214 0.2088 0.0099
[0.131, 2.912]** [-0.089, 0.507] [0.000, 0.020]**
Panel B: Full set of controls
Conflict (1st and 2nd trimesters) -0.4402 -0.2028 -0.0026
[-0.811, -0.069]** [-0.404, -0.002]** [-0.005, -0.000]**
Conflict (3rd trimester) 1.4157 0.2208 0.0098
[-0.000, 2.831]* [-0.080, 0.521] [-0.001, 0.021]*
Number of Number of Number of
Conflict measure months with months with Casualties
conflict (ACLED) conflict (UCDP) (UCDP)
District FE   
Month-year FE   
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution
of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; Standard errors clustered
at the district level and 95% confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method)
and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients. Full set of controls include a dummy being
part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive
by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the household, the
household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies,
and the malaria index.
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Table A7: The impact of conflict on girls’ survival rates–alternative specifications
Dependent variable: Girls’ survival rate
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events -0.0051 -0.0053 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0041
(0.0017)*** (0.0024)** (0.0025) (0.0007)*** (0.0014)***
[-0.01, -0.002]** [-0.013, -0.0007]** [-0.012, 0.0027] [ -0.0044, -0.0004]** [-0.0092, 0.0015]
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.0020 -0.0028 -0.0038
(0.0022)** (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0009)*** (0.0012)***
[-0.012, -0.0001]** [-0.014, 0.0008]* [-0.012, 0.0036] [ -0.0054, 0.0001]* [ -0.0077, 0.0015]
Month FE 
Year FE 
Linear trends 
Includes nonresidents & DHS 2013  
Poisson model  
Month-year FE    
N 2007 2007 2919 2007 2919
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated
on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by
wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. All regressions
control for in utero exposure to conflict. Climatic controls include rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS
= ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table A8: The impact of conflict on survival rates at 12 months - alternative conflict measures
Dependent variable: Survival rate
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Number of months with conflict (ACLED) 0.0028 -0.0223 0.0031 -0.0029 0.0012 -0.0272
(0.00238) (0.0224) (0.0038) (0.0293) (0.0026) (0.0152)*
[-0.0017, 0.0083] [ -0.14, 0.021] [-0.0049, 0.013] [ -0.14, 0.099] [-0.0048, 0.0066] [-0.077, -0.003]**
Number of months with conflict (UCDP) 0.0033 -0.0088 0.0012 0.0032 0.0038 -0.0225
(0.0045) (0.0214) (0.0037) (0.0165) (0.0049) (0.0351)
[-0.0047, 0.0116] [-0.0330, 0.0161] [-0.0056, 0.0079] [-0.0295, 0.0345] [-0.0053, 0.0130] [-0.0527, 0.0097]
Number of casualties (UCDP) -0.00002 -0.0002 0.00008 -0.00004 -0.00009 -0.0003
(0.00006) (0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0003) (0.00005)* (0.0002)*
[-0.0002,0.0002] [-0.0011,0.0002] [ -0.0001,0.0002] [-0.0012,0.0006] [-0.0003,0.0001] [-0.0009, -0.00006]**
Panel B: Climatic controls
Number of months with conflict (ACLED) 0.0038 -0.0236 0.0044 -0.0069 0.0023 -0.026
(0.0023) (0.0245) (0.0032) (0.0313) (0.00266) (0.0172)
[-0.0007, 0.0092]* [-0.15, 0.025] [-0.0024, 0.013] [ -0.15, 0.083] [-0.0034, 0.0077] [ -0.078, 0.0048]*
Number of months with conflict (UCDP) 0.0042 -0.0118 0.0020 -0.0016 0.0048 -0.0173
(0.0043) (0.0245) (0.0037) (0.017) (0.0046) (0.0326)
[-0.0036, 0.0120] [-0.0387, 0.0143] [-0.0050, 0.0089] [-0.0346, 0.0331] [-0.0035, 0.0133] [-0.0474, 0.0118]
Number of casualties (12m) (UCDP) -0.00008 -0.0003 0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.0004
(0.00006) (0.0003) (0.00006) (0.0004) (0.00005)* (0.0002)
[-0.0002,0.0002] [-0.0013, 0.0002] [ -0.00017,0.00027] [-0.0012,0.0007] [-0.0003,0.0001] [-0.001, -0.00002]**
District FE      
Month-year FE      
N 2485 2485 1996 1996 1933 1933
Notes: Each coefficient results from a separate regression. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics;
correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; Standard errors clustered at the district level and confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap
(percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients. Full set of controls include a dummy being part of a multiple birth, a dummy for
being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the household, the
household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index.
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Table A9: The impact of conflict on girls’ mortality–alternative specifications
Dependent variable: Girls’ mortality at 12 months
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No controls
Conflict Events 0.0060 0.0063 0.0024 0.0023 0.0019
(0.0032)* (0.0036)* (0.0013)* (0.0010)** (0.0004)***
[0.0012, 0.01055]*** [0.0006, 0.01188]* [0.0003, 0.0046]* [0.0004, 0.0042]* [0.0009, 0.0030]***
Panel B: Climatic controls
Conflict Events 0.0076 0.006 0.0032 0.0018 0.0019
(0.0040)* (0.0035)* (0.0014)** (0.0005)*** (0.0003)***
[0.0026, 0.0125]** [0.0003, 0.0115]* [0.0012, 0.0053]*** [0.0008, 0.0027]*** [0.0011, 0.0027]***
Month FE 
Year FE 
Linear trends 
Includes nonresidents & DHS 2013  
Poisson model  
Month-year FE    
N 5155 5155 13787 5155 13787
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses; P-values are calculated on
the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by wild
bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients reported in squared brackets. Full set of controls include
a dummy being part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2,
2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the household, the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall
anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index. OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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Table A10: The impact of conflict on infant mortality - alternative conflict measures
Dependent variable: Mortality rate at 12 months
All Boys Girls
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
Number of months with conflict (ACLED) -0.0045* 0.0050 -0.0091 -0.0324 -0.0094* 0.0688*
[-0.009, 0.000] [-0.036, 0.046] [-0.022, 0.004] [-0.106, 0.041] [-0.019, 0.001] [-0.008, 0.145]
Number of months with conflict (UCDP) -0.0056** 0.0087 -0.0149** -0.0555 -0.0018 0.1921*
[-0.010, -0.001] [-0.063, 0.080] [-0.027, -0.003] [-0.182, 0.071] [-0.008, 0.004] [-0.022, 0.406]
Number of casualties (UCDP) -0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0006 0.0001 0.0013*
[-0.000, -0.000] [-0.001, 0.001] [-0.000, -0.000] [-0.002, 0.001] [-0.000, 0.000] [-0.000, 0.003]
Panel B: Full set of controls
Number of months with conflict (ACLED) -0.0044** 0.0115 -0.0106* -0.0040 -0.0048** 0.0485**
[-0.008, -0.001] [-0.033, 0.056] [-0.022, 0.000] [-0.013, 0.005] [-0.009, -0.001] [0.003, 0.094]
Number of months with conflict (UCDP) -0.0055* 0.0182 -0.0142** -0.0040 0.0033 0.0873**
[-0.011, 0.000] [-0.052, 0.088] [-0.028, -0.001] [-0.013, 0.005] [-0.002, 0.008] [0.006, 0.0169]
Number of casualties (UCDP) -0.0001** 0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0040 0.0002*** 0.0010**
[-0.000, -0.000] [-0.001, 0.001] [-0.000, -0.000] [-0.013, 0.005] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.002]
District FE      
Month-year FE      
Notes: Each coefficient results from a separate regression. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical
distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95% confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap
(percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients. Full set of controls include a dummy being part of a multiple birth,
a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the
wealth of the household, the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria
index.
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Table A11: The impact of conflict on infant mortality removing mines’ neighborhood
Dependent variable: Mortality rate at 12 months
Boys Girls
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: excluding < 10km
Conflict Events -0.0043 -0.0015 0.0061** 0.0062**
[-0.017, 0.008] [-0.010, 0.007] [0.001, 0.011] [0.001, 0.012]
Panel B: excluding < 20km
Conflict Events -0.0057 -0.0022 0.0064** 0.0066**
[-0.023, 0.012] [-0.015, 0.011] [0.001, 0.012] [0.000, 0.013]
Panel C: excluding < 30km
Conflict Events -0.0104 -0.0052 0.0085** 0.0087**
[-0.035, 0.014] [-0.024, 0.013] [0.001, 0.016] [0.002, 0.016]
District FE    
Month-year FE    
Full set of controls  
Notes: Panel A, B and C exclude residents located within 10, 20 and 30 km from the mines,
respectively; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical
distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; sample of residents only; 95%
confidence intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the
empirical distribution of coefficients. Full set of controls include a dummy being part of a
multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by
age group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the household,
the household size, a dummy for female headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature
anomalies, and the malaria index. 2SLS = two-stage least squares.
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TABLE A12: Exploring potential behavioral factors behind the gender-specific effect
Dependent variable: Girls’ mortality at 12 months
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict*Female headed HH -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0011
[-0.006, 0.004] [-0.040, 0.041] [-0.006, 0.004] [-0.007, 0.003] [-0.004, 0.002] [-0.004, 0.002]
Conflict*Widow 0.0009 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0010
[-0.006, 0.008] [-0.007, 0.008] [-0.009, 0.011] [-0.007, 0.006] [-0.005, 0.003] [-0.005, 0.003]
Conflict* # brothers 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0003
[-0.001, 0.003] [-0.002, 0.003] [-0.001, 0.003] [-0.001, 0.003] [-0.001, 0.000] [-0.001, 0.000]
Conflict* # sisters -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0006
[-0.005 - 0.001] [-0.006 - 0.001] [-0.005, 0.001] [-0.004, 0.001] [-0.002, 0.001] [-0.002, 0.001]
Conflict*Son preference -0.0007 0.1499 0.1429 0.1741 -0.0162 -0.0162
[-0.003, 0.001] [-0.259, 0.558] [-0.252, 0.538] [-0.200, 0.549] [-0.083, 0.051] [-0.083, 0.051]
Month FE 
Year FE 
Linear trends  
Includes DHS 2013  
Includes nonresidents   
Month-year FE     
Notes: Each coefficient is produced by a separate regression. Only the interaction term of interest is reported. *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1; P-values are calculated on the empirical distribution of t-statistics; correction for sampling weights; 95% confidence
intervals produced by wild bootstrap (percentile-t method) and based on the empirical distribution of coefficients; All regressions
include a dummy being part of a multiple birth, a dummy for being the first child, the number of brothers and sisters alive by age
group (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4), mother’s education, a measure of the wealth of the household, the household size, a dummy for female
headed household, rainfall anomalies, temperature anomalies, and the malaria index.
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